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BANKRUPTCY
May a Bankruptcy Court Award Fees to Debtor’s Counsel
For Its Work Defending Its Fee Application?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes the retention of lawyers and other professionals to provide necessary
services to the trustee or debtor in possession. The lawyers and other professionals must submit fee
applications itemizing their work for approval by the bankruptcy court, and those applications can be
challenged by creditors and other parties in interest. This case asks whether a bankruptcy court has the
authority to award fees to a law firm to cover its work in defending against challenges brought to its fee
applications.

Baker Botts v. ASARCO
Docket No. 14-103
Argument Date: February 25, 2015
From: The Fifth Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
Baker Botts was appointed by the bankruptcy court as counsel
for ASARCO, a multibillion dollar mining concern, in its chapter
11 proceeding. The case was extraordinarily successful from the
point of view of creditors, who were repaid in full—more than $3.6
billion—and ASARCO, which emerged as a viable reorganized
company. The case was not as favorably viewed by ASARCO’s parent,
which had to pay ASARCO’s creditors because Baker Botts had
obtained a judgment for ASARCO against the parent company for
more than $7 billion based on the transfer of ASARCO assets to the
parent company several years earlier. Baker Botts ultimately applied
for more than $113 million in fees and $6 million in expenses for its
work on the large, complex case.
Under the plan of reorganization, “Reorganized ASARCO”came
back under the control of the parent company, and it promptly filed
extensive objections to Baker Botts’s fee application. The result
was extensive discovery and litigation, at the end of which the
bankruptcy court overruled all of the objections. It then granted
Baker Botts’s request for another $5 million in fees incurred in
litigating its fee application. ASARCO appealed, and the district
court affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a court
to award fees to the debtor’s counsel for the work involved in
defending its fee application. This created a circuit split, which the
Supreme Court must now address.

ISSUE
Does Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes
the court to award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered” by professionals retained by the debtor with the
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court’s approval, give the court discretion to award compensation to
debtor’s counsel for work performed in defending its fee application?

FACTS
ASARCO, LLC (respondent), is a copper mining, smelting, and
refining company that filed for chapter 11 in 2005. Copper prices
were low and the company faced various environmental, labor,
and tax problems, so the prospects for a successful reorganization
appeared dim and creditors were expected to receive only a small
percentage of their claims. With the bankruptcy court’s approval,
ASARCO retained Baker Botts, LLP (petitioner) as its bankruptcy
counsel. During the case, Baker Botts represented ASARCO in
challenging as a fraudulent conveyance the transfer from ASARCO
to its parent, two years earlier, of a controlling interest in Southern
Copper Corporation (described by the trial court as ASARCO’s
“crown jewel”). ASARCO prevailed, obtaining a judgment against
the parent for “between $7 billion and $10 billion,” the largest
fraudulent transfer judgment in the history of chapter 11. As a
result, ASARCO’s creditors were paid in full and the company
emerged from bankruptcy in 2009 with little debt, $1.4 billion in
cash, and many of its other issues resolved. However, the parent
company regained control over ASARCO when ASARCO emerged
from bankruptcy, and ASARCO promptly filed objections to all of
Baker Botts fee requests.
Baker Botts requested approximately $120 million in compensation
for their “core” work on the bankruptcy case plus a 20 percent
enhancement based on the success of the case and quality of the
work performed. ASARCO raised numerous objections to the fee
application and sought extensive discovery. After a six-day trial on
the fee objections, the bankruptcy court rejected all of ASARCO’s
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challenges, awarding approximately $120 million in core fees,
plus the 20 percent enhancement for a portion of the work (the
fraudulent transfer action), which added another $4.2 million.
Baker Botts also sought more than $8 million in compensation for
litigating ASARCO’s fee objections. The bankruptcy court held that
Section 330(a) permits the court to award compensation for the
preparation and successful defense of a fee application, but that the
fees requested were unreasonably high, awarding about $5 million.
On appeal, ASARCO dropped its objections to the core fees, but
challenged the award of fees incurred defending the fee application
(the “fees on fees”) and the 20 percent enhancement for the
fraudulent transfer work. The district court largely affirmed, noting
that “[a] seven billion dollar judgment, which is recoverable, which
saves a company, and funds a 100% recovery for all concerned is a
once in a lifetime result.” It held that petitioner was entitled to the
fees for defending its core fees, though it was not entitled to fees
incurred in seeking the enhancement or correcting any deficiencies
in the original fee application. On remand, the bankruptcy court
reaffirmed the $5 million in fees, saying none were attributable to
the prohibited matters.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the fee enhancement but reversed the
award for petitioner’s fee defense, holding that “Section 330(a) does
not authorize compensation for the costs counsel or professionals
bear to defend their fee applications.” The court relied on Section
330(a)(4), which states that professional services are compensable
only if they are either “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s
estate” or “necessary to the administration of the case.” The court
held that the defense of a fee application does not satisfy either
criterion because “[t]he primary beneficiary of a professional fee
application … is the professional” rather than the estate. The court
also relied on Section 330(a)(6), which permits compensation for
“the preparation of a fee application,” but does not mention the
defense of a fee application.

CASE ANALYSIS
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, compensation for professionals
retained in the bankruptcy case “emphasized economy of
administration and conservation of the estate,” and the view was
that bankruptcy professionals should be compensated at the low end
of the range of fees charged by comparable professionals in other
contexts. When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it
abandoned this view, adopting the position that it was necessary
to pay market rates to attract high-quality practitioners; otherwise,
the bankruptcy system would be less efficient, undermining
reorganizations and reducing recoveries for creditors. While the
fees of bankruptcy professionals would be scrutinized by the court,
the policy was to compensate attorneys and other professionals at
the same rate they earn for comparable services to other clients.
Professionals are appointed under Section 327 of the Code, which
provides that a bankruptcy trustee (or debtor in possession in a
chapter 11) may, with court approval, employ professionals “that do
not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee [or DIP]
in carrying out [its] duties under this title.” Under Section 328(a),
the retention may be on “any reasonable terms and conditions of
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employment,” but the court may award different compensation
“after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and
conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments
not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such
terms and conditions.” The court may also deny compensation “if, at
any time during” the employment, “such professional person is not
a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to
the interest of the estate with respect to the matter on which such
professional person is employed.”
Section 330(a) provides that after notice to parties in interest
and to the United States Trustee, and a hearing, “the court may
award … (A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered … and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary
expenses.” It also provides factors for determining the amount
of compensation, directing the court to “consider the nature,
the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account
all relevant factors, including” the time spent, the rates charged,
whether the services were “necessary to the administration of, or
beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward
the completion of, a case under this title,” the professional’s skills
and qualifications, and the compensation charged by similar
practitioners in nonbankruptcy settings. Finally, Section 330(a)
(4) precludes compensation for “(i) unnecessary duplication of
services; or (ii) services that were not (I) reasonably likely to
benefit the debtor’s estate; or (II) necessary to the administration of
the case.”
Under this system, a professional retained by the estate must
file detailed fee applications, which can then be scrutinized and
objected to by the U.S. Trustee and any other parties in the case,
before the court rules on the amount of compensation to be
awarded. Thus, the preparation of detailed billing documents is part
of the process, as is the need to respond in a judicial hearing to any
objections to the fees asserted.
Petitioner argues that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code intended to provide
professionals with compensation equivalent to that they would
receive in other contexts, but in other contexts their bills are not
subject to challenge by third parties and do not have to be defended
before a judge. If the costs of defending a fee application from such
challenges are not compensable, the compensation of bankruptcy
professionals will be “diluted” compared with compensation in
other contexts. The Code grants a great deal of discretion to the
bankruptcy judge in determining fee awards, and the goal of parity,
petitioner argues, requires that the court be allowed to award “fees
on fees” in appropriate cases.
Petitioner also points out that in 1994, the Code was amended
to include in Section 330, among the factors to be considered in
determining reasonable compensation, whether the services were
“necessary for the administration of, or beneficial … toward the
completion of, a case under this title,” a standard much broader
than whether the services directly benefit the estate. Hearings
to determine the compensation of professionals retained by the
estate, which are administrative expenses that must be paid for
any plan of reorganization to be confirmed, are a necessary part of
“administration of … the case” and “complet[ing] a case under this
title,” and the fees incurred in those hearing are thus compensable.
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ASARCO argues, however, that Section 330 provides standards
for compensating professionals retained under Section 327 “to
assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this
title,” but defending a fee application does nothing to assist the
trustee in carrying out its duties, which run to the estate, not to
the professional. Thus, respondent argues, Section 330 does not
permit the court to award fees on fees because they are not within
the scope of a professional’s retention under Section 327. Moreover,
respondent argues, Section 330 only authorizes compensation for
“necessary services rendered by” a professional, but defending
the professional’s own fee application is not “necessary” to the
bankruptcy estate or case, helping only the professional itself. Nor
can work the professional does on its own behalf be considered
“services rendered.”
In fact, respondent argues, fee litigation goes beyond not assisting
the trustee; it is directly contrary to the interests of the trustee and
the bankruptcy estate because fees diminish the estate, reducing
the assets available to pay other creditors. Section 328(c) says that
the court may deny compensation to a professional if “at any time
during such professional person’s employment” the professional
“holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect
to the matter on which such professional person is employed.”
In litigating its fees, respondent argues, a professional “holds an
adverse interest to the estate,” and must be denied compensation.
Respondent also argues that Section 330 expressly addresses
fees for work spent preparing a fee application, and by not
mentioning fee litigation, it implicitly denies that such litigation is
compensable. Petitioner responds that this misreads the provision,
which limits the compensation for preparing fee applications to that
“based on the level and skills reasonably necessary” to prepare the
application; the authority to compensate for this work exists under
the general standards of Sections 327 and 330, which, petitioner
argues, also authorize compensation for fee litigation—and
Congress did not limit compensation for such litigation, as it did
compensation for the preparation of the application itself.
ASARCO argues that petitioner’s position is an attempt to impose
fee shifting, in place of the American rule under which litigants
bear their own costs and fees, despite the absence of a statute
expressly providing for fee shifting. They concede that such fees
could be awarded as a sanction in the event of bad faith or frivolous
objections, but no such argument was made in this case, and
without such justification or an express fee-shifting provision, the
intent of the statute must have been to retain the default rule that
parties bear their own litigation costs.
The United States filed an amicus brief supporting petitioner,
arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, by categorically precluding
fees on fees, would dilute the compensation of bankruptcy
professionals, but making a slightly different argument from that of
petitioner. Petitioner argues that the fee litigation itself is “services
rendered” for which it is entitled to reasonable compensation. The
United States argues that “services rendered” more naturally refers
to work for a client, not efforts to recover its fees. However, such
fee litigation should be considered part of the underlying work for
the trustee or debtor because the statute requires the fee approval
process in order for the professional to be retained and perform
that underlying work, and compensating for that litigation may be
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appropriate and necessary to ensure that the professional receive
“reasonable” compensation for the underlying work. (Although the
briefs do not make this point, this is consistent with fact that most
retainer agreements used by professionals outside of bankruptcy
contain express provisions entitling the professional to recover
costs and fees should it have to sue to collect its fees.)

SIGNIFICANCE
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that if fees on fees are denied,
the compensation of professionals will be diluted, but reasoned
that permitting fees on fees would encourage fee litigation, to the
detriment of the estate and its creditors. This essentially rejected
the bankruptcy court’s reasoning that to deny fees on fees might
encourage parties to challenge the debtor’s counsel’s fee requests
simply to extract concessions or use the prospect of such challenges
to pressure the debtor and its counsel. The bankruptcy court would
seem to have the better of this argument because if Baker Botts
prevails, that does not establish a right for professionals always
to collect the costs of fee litigation; it merely recognizes that the
bankruptcy court has the discretion to make such an award in
appropriate cases. This should discourage fee challenges that
lack a sound foundation. If fees on fees are categorically barred,
professionals may well have to settle questionable claims to avoid
litigation, giving a tool to those parties who oppose the work being
done by the debtor’s professionals.

Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He
can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139.
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For Petitioner Baker Botts, LLP (Aaron M. Streett, 713.229.1234)
For Respondent ASARCO, LLC (Jeffrey L. Oldham, 713.221.1225)

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioner Baker Botts, LLP
Bankruptcy Law Scholars (Susan M. Freeman, 602.262.5756)
Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Business
Law Section of the Florida Bar, the Bankruptcy Law Section of
the Louisiana State Bar Association, and the Bankruptcy Law
Section of the Beverly Hills Bar Association (Christopher Landau,
202.879.5000)
Former Bankruptcy Judges Leif M. Clark and Judith K. Fitzgerald
(James Patrick Sullivan, 512.457.2014)
National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees (Catherine Steege,
312.222.9350)
National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees (Henry E.
Hildebrand III, 615.244.1101)
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National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (David R.
Kuney, 202.736.8650)
State Bar of Texas Bankruptcy Law Section (John P. Elwood,
202.639.6500)

In Support of Reversal
For the United States (Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Solicitor General,
202.514.2217)
In Support of Neither Party
For Neutral Fee Examiners (Brady C. Williamson, 608.257.3911)

In Support of Respondent ASARCO, LLC
Professors Richard Aaron, Jagdeep S. Bhandari, Susan Block-Lieb,
Robert D’Agostino, George W. Kuney, Lawrence Ponoroff, and Keith
Sharfman (Richard Lieb, 212.479.6020)
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